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Abstract. Outsourcing inherently considers what activity needs to reside within a given firm. The difficulty of exchanges be-
tween firms in the face of uncertainty affects where work on developing and producing new products is performed. Theory is
developed and explored using a case study that explains firm sourcing decisions as a response to uncertainty within the context
of industry structure and related transaction costs. Viewing outsourcing broadly results in a better delineation of outsourcing
options. Implications for management research and practice are identified.
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1. Introduction
Managers cannot ignore outsourcing as they decide
how and where work will be performed. A broad view
of outsourcing, involving the integration of activity
both internal and external to a firm into its overall op-
erations, guides the current research. Selection of a
firm’s boundaries represents a critical strategic deci-
sion [6]; this is particularly true for firms facing innov-
ative demands that require allocating scarce resources
between clear current needs and ambiguous future-
oriented needs [32]. Rapid change limits the ability
*The views expressed in this research are those of the authors and
do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air
Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
of any single firm to have all the resources needed
to sustain competitive advantage [64], driving firms to
adopt multiple organizational forms. Markets comple-
ment organizations, and outsourcing decisions shape
firm boundaries. The goal of the present research is to
identify and evaluate factors driving sourcing decisions
for firms facing innovative pressures.
Research needs to examine the decisions behind or-
ganizing innovative activity [38,65], as extant research
tends to focus primarily on hierarchy or market trans-
actions [24], or a single “hybrid” classification [41,74].
Existing classifications typically do not fully capture or
distinguish between the underlying variety of interme-
diate organizational forms that combine aspects of both
hierarchies and markets – reality relies somewhere be-
tween these extremes. For example, firm sourcing deci-
sions include mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures,
preferred suppliers, and market competition [9,74].
Further, simultaneous pressures to innovate and reduce
costs drive managers to continually adapt or adjust firm
boundaries [28].
The premise of the current research is that uncer-
tainty influences firm outsourcing, or decisions on
where work is performed. Propositions are developed
combining transaction cost economics [14,72] and in-
dustrial organization economics [55], as an initial point
of departure. The linking of these different theories in
the selection of firm boundaries both broadens and ex-
tends each theory and represents an important contri-
bution. The propositions focus on firm behavior and
performance beginning with alliances (Proposition 1),
0167-2533/06/$17.00 2006 – IOS Press and the authors. All rights reserved
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and then continuing with acquisition activity (Proposi-
tions 2a through 2c), contractual relationships (Propo-
sitions 3a and 3b), and market competition (Proposi-
tions 4a and 4b). The propositions are then explored
using a case study before concluding with a discussion
of implications for management research and practice.
2. Theoretical background
Theoretical perspectives from economics, strategy,
and sociology outline different motivations for inter-
mediate organizational forms. Research suggests that
intermediate organizational forms have their own ratio-
nale, but a unifying purpose for their use remains to be
identified [9]. A possible explanation for this is that the
context of sourcing decisions is a critical variable [34]
that may influence selection of organizational forms.
For example, transaction cost economics has been crit-
icized in situations where technology considerations
predominate [22], and findings suggest that interme-
diate organizational forms, such as joint ventures, are
more common in technology intensive industries [34].
Uncertainty may serve as a contextual factor that
drives managers to select different organizational forms.
In an environment with innovative pressures, managers
may seek to both minimize costs (e.g., transaction
cost economics, see Coase [14]; Williamson [72]) and
maximize revenue (e.g., industrial organization, see
Kogut [34]; Porter [55]). In other words, uncertainty
will drive managers to satisfice by primarily focusing
either on costs or revenue in an attempt to achieve
higher financial performance.
2.1. Transaction costs
Transaction cost economics inherently addresses the
comparison of feasible organizational forms [75], and
holds that managers choose the least costly method of
organizing [67]. Market exchange is generally consid-
ered more efficient than internalizing transactions, as it
allows parties of a transaction to be competitively se-
lected and drives the most efficient pricing for buyers
and suppliers. However, Oliver Williamson [72] sug-
gests that market failure precludes market exchange
and drives internalization of exchanges within a firm.
Williamson originally outlined five situations that in-
volve market failure:
• Bounded Rationality, human beings tend to search
for adequate and not optimum solutions,
• Uncertainty/Complexity, conditions without read-
ily discernable patterns or manageable number of
interactions that would facilitate decision making,
• Information Impactedness, information asymme-
try involving situations where one party is bet-
ter informed than the other making contractual
arrangements difficult or expensive to verify,
• Opportunism, power imbalances that allow one
party of a contractual relationship to pursue self-
interests, and/or
• Small Numbers, reduction in business choices re-
sulting from limited quantities of either buyers or
suppliers [72, pp. 39–40].
Later, a sixth market failure involving asset specificity,
or a condition created from recurring transactions that
creates progressively stronger bilateral relationships,
was identified [73].
As Coase [14] observed, it is unlikely that firms
would exist without uncertainty and that, when price
information is difficult to obtain, transactions inter-
nal to a firm will be cheaper than market transactions.
Specifically, uncertainty escalates commitment costs
for firms, contributing to intermediate organizational
forms [23]. While not unique to innovative industries,
bounded rationality is more likely to exist in innovative
industries where uncertainty makes optimization diffi-
cult, if not impossible. For example, under conditions
of frequent technology change early product designs
may serve as market experiments [32].
Uncertainty also heightens information asymmetry
as firms hold differentiated information, contributing
to the difficulty of appraising and selling innovative re-
sources [76]. Uncertainty can also lead to asset speci-
ficity as collaborating firms make specific resource in-
vestments that can compound information asymme-
try. Further, the market for technology resources can
also exhibit small numbers, as patents or other imped-
iments limit alternatives for potential suppliers. Inter-
mediate organizational forms incorporate safeguards
against opportunism [23] that can minimize cost in the
face of uncertainty.
2.2. Industrial organization
In regard to making an organizational sourcing de-
cision, industrial organization economics research fo-
cuses on industry analysis and market positioning that
balances speed and cost of entry into a market [65]. In-
dustrial organization recognizes that no firm, or strat-
egy, can remain static [30] and that changes in a firm’s
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external environment will necessitate changes in firm
boundaries. Selection of a market position is a concern
in innovative industries, as technology investments can
act as an entry barrier, as firms achieve economies of
scale and accumulate patents [63]. Additionally, inter-
mediate organizational forms offer multiple competi-
tive positioning advantages. For example, advantages
of intermediate organizational forms include: access-
ing resources faster than internal development [35], of-
fering a means of accessing complementary resources
from other organizations [19], deterring or preempting
rival firms [23,35], exposing a firm to new ideas, and
learning about the level of technology held by competi-
tors [42].
Under conditions of high uncertainty, early invest-
ments can be viewed as real options [65]. Applying real
options logic or reasoning [45] to firm investment de-
cisions helps explain why firms delay under conditions
of uncertainty [48]. Real option reasoning allows firms
to avoid locking in on uncertain technology by allocat-
ing resources among alternatives until one technology
is clearly superior. Assuming an option to invest per-
sists, it is rational for firms to wait until uncertainty is
reduced [18] and the value of the underlying option is
less ambiguous.
2.3. Summary
Uncertainty will influence management decisions on
firm boundary selection due to difficulty in exchang-
ing innovative resources [23]. From a transaction cost
perspective, firms will expand until the cost of internal
organization equals the cost of market exchange [67].
From a standpoint of industrial organization, extend-
ing a firm’s boundaries to include market transactions
enhances revenue by spreading risk [38], monitoring
the technology of competitors [42], and co-opting po-
tential competition [7]. Propositions relating to the im-
pact of uncertainty on firm sourcing decisions are de-
veloped in the following section.
3. Technology change and organizing for
innovation
The diffusion of innovations in social systems is
well documented [44], but the organization of innov-
ative activity is less well understood [24,38,65]. The
current premise is that uncertainty, inversely propor-
tional to the S-curve describing technology diffusion,
drives firm sourcing decisions (see Fig. 1). Uncer-
Fig. 1. Uncertainty and firm sourcing decisions.
tainty impacts investment decisions [50] and technol-
ogy change creates uncertainty by impacting the com-
petitive dynamics for firms [4]. Anderson and Tush-
man [4] outline a three-stage model of industry-level
technological change that relates to different levels of
uncertainty:
(1) High uncertainty when a discontinuity alters
how market needs are met,
(2) Moderate uncertainty surrounding the inflection
point or emergence of a dominant design that
establishes core product features, and
(3) Low uncertainty when the focus shifts to incre-
mental improvements of a product technology’s
efficiency or performance.
Propositions for firm sourcing decisions related to
Fig. 1 are developed in the following subsections.
3.1. Alliance
Alliances under high uncertainty involve collabora-
tion between firms that can take multiple forms and
serve multiple purposes. Collaboration between firms
is more likely in changing environments [37], as a
means of managing risk [23] and mitigating vulnera-
ble strategic positions [21]. Collaboration offers firms
the benefit of timely entry, as the persistence of op-
tions is uncertain [1]. The value associated with ex-
ecuting an option or making a larger investment will
increase once uncertainty is resolved [50], if the op-
tion to invest persists [18] and represents a desired out-
come. Firms that fail to take advantage of investment
opportunities risk being locked out [27] suggesting that
firms, when faced with uncertainty, often make a port-
folio of investments to maintain options. Still, the ben-
efits of maintaining long-term relationships may ex-
hibit diminishing returns, so organizations tend to have
no more partners than necessary [17].
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In an environment of high uncertainty, alliances may
be preferred to acquiring external resources [6] and can
represent the initiation of an option when investments
exhibit path dependence [36]. Intermediate organiza-
tional forms, such as joint ventures and alliances, un-
der conditions of high uncertainty are better suited
for dealing with asymmetric information and diffi-
culty in valuing complementary resources than acqui-
sitions [5]. For example, information asymmetry prob-
lems that make investing in another firm difficult are
mitigated in joint ventures that align agency interests
and reduce information asymmetry [38]. Additionally,
intermediate organizational forms, such as joint ven-
tures that combine diverse firm resources [41], con-
tribute to learning [5] that can reduce uncertainty. Fur-
ther, alliances typically involve less strategic and finan-
cial commitment, and will be viewed as less risky than
other options, when uncertainty is high. Therefore, the
following relationship is proposed:
Proposition 1. Under conditions of high uncertainty,
firms will enter into alliances to lower individual firm
risk in accessing needed resources.
3.2. Acquisition activity
Alliances may also contribute to acquisition activ-
ity between collaborating firms, and provide partner
firms an advantage relative to outside buyers. Alliances
and joint ventures allow firms to learn more about
their partners and underlying resources, which con-
tributes to reduced information asymmetry surround-
ing the value of resources in both firms. Over time,
recurring transactions can also contribute to situations
where one firm becomes dependent on a partner in a
joint venture or alliance [39].
Firm investments can lead to asset specificity be-
tween alliance partners and create friction [56], if un-
certainty that contributed to the selection of an inter-
mediate organizational form is also reduced or ini-
tial contractual arrangements are later deemed unfair.
For example, the emergence of a technology standard,
or dominant design [4], reduces uncertainty and can
act to clarify relative partner firm strengths and weak-
nesses [32], and can expose contractual relationships
to breakdowns [55].
Alliances may serve as a precursor to an acquisi-
tion as information shared between firms reduces un-
certainty [23] that contributes to better valuation of re-
sources [35]. Reduced uncertainty that leads to break-
downs can help explain alliance instability [36], and
observations that half of all alliances fail [19]. While
internalization of resources within a single firm be-
tween alliance partners is not inevitable, information
shared as part of an alliance can contribute to internal-
izing problematic transactions through an acquisition.
Therefore, the following relationship is proposed:
Proposition 2a. Learning as a result of alliances re-
duces uncertainty and contributes to firms acquiring
partner firms or joint ventures.
If moderate levels of uncertainty allow satisfactory
valuation of resources, firms may employ acquisitions
to bring resources under a hierarchy to further reduce
uncertainty [29]. In innovative industries where re-
sponse times are important, acquisitions of required re-
sources will more likely occur, once a resource need is
apparent [12]. Acquisitions typically offer lower cost
of entry and exposure to superior resources [10]. Ad-
ditionally, acquisitions represent a method for sustain-
ing or increasing innovative output [2]. Further, other
alternatives may be precluded due to market break-
downs, such as patent protection [55] or opportunistic
partners [23]. Still, internalization of transactions into
a single firm will not ordinarily occur unless it results
in lower transaction costs [38].
Lower transaction costs from internalization are
more likely when exchanges involve uneven bargain-
ing positions [26]. Uneven bargaining positions can ex-
ist in innovative industries, if a small number of firms
own a given technology or a firm’s patent protects crit-
ical technology. As the value of needed resources be-
comes clear and external resource dependence exists,
critical or problematic exchanges will often be inter-
nalized within a firm through an acquisition [54]. This
result comes from acquisitions offering greater control
over and faster access to resources [32]. Therefore, the
following relationship is proposed:
Proposition 2b. Under moderate uncertainty and few
sources of supply, firms will complete acquisitions to
lower costs.
3.3. Contractual relationships
Contractual relationships (i.e., licensing, supplier
agreements, and so on) represent distinct outsourcing
options. For example, licensing is different from joint
ventures as licenses typically simply transfer patent
rights, while joint ventures transfer both patent rights
and tacit knowledge [26]. Contractual relationships in-
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volve transactions designed to gain access to resources
external to a firm, and their appeal rests on the recog-
nition that a single firm cannot innovate as well as a
combination of firms [42]. Contractual relationships
drive participating firms to make relationship-specific
resource investments that may contribute to increased
opportunism [6]. However, the threat of market com-
petition can reduce transaction costs in the presence of
specific assets [7].
Firms may seek preferred suppliers for critical parts
in conditions where some uncertainty remains and
multiple suppliers exist to maintain the threat of com-
petition. If a single supplier is used, the threat of com-
petition can help limit the market power of a sole
source to help keep costs competitive [15]. Identifying
preferred suppliers can offer the benefits of increased
quality and reduced risk in integrating subsystems–
conditions that further reduce uncertainty. Additional
circumstances may contribute to the use of contractual
relationships.
Market structure may encourage the use of contrac-
tual relationships. For example, antitrust concerns sur-
rounding levels of competition can lead to legal agree-
ments that require firms to license critical technology
[55]. This has the effect of lowering the costs associ-
ated with technology transfer by setting more favorable
terms than may result from a court settlement or deci-
sion [31]. Further, contractual relationships may sim-
ply be needed to allow independent joint ventures to
share technology with participating firms. For exam-
ple, a joint venture with complementary patents needed
for a product may have to pool them into a license to
its parent firms [61]. These situations are referred to
as cross-licensing or sharing licenses between partici-
pating firms, and it can provide participating firms ef-
ficient access to needed technology without incurring
reverse engineering costs [3].
Firms may also pursue contractual relationships for
strategic purposes, such as faster response times [16],
or avoiding expenses required to successfully market
a product [32]. For example, managers may choose to
have independent components manufactured by reli-
able suppliers when they are focused on developing
other resources [11]. Even if a single supplier is used,
the threat of competition can help limit the market
power of a sole source to help keep resource costs com-
petitive [15]. Additionally, the use of contractual rela-
tionships may facilitate the continued development of
a firm’s resource base by exposing a firm to superior
information [56]. Therefore, the following is proposed:
Proposition 3a. Under conditions of low to moder-
ate uncertainty, firms use contractual relationships to
lower the cost of accessing resources.
Contractual relationships exhibit potential hazards.
If not managed properly, contractual relationships have
recognized disadvantages. For example, a disadvan-
tage of licensing relates to developing competitors,
when managers improperly identify potential competi-
tors [55]. Sharing information with competitors may
be unavoidable. For example, antitrust concerns may
lead firms to license core knowledge or be required
for a joint venture to share technology with partici-
pating firms [31]. Increased competition from licens-
ing can stimulate innovation and expand markets [32],
and may place further innovative pressure on firms
to use contractual relationships for accessing external
knowledge. However, managed effectively the benefits
of contractual relationships outweigh potential risks.
Contractual relationships represent a strategy man-
agers can use to increase the profits of their firms.
While providing other firms access to knowledge, con-
tractual relationships can provide a technology leader
additional profit from their stock of knowledge [55].
For example, IBM during 2000 received $1.7B in
revenues from licensing that enjoyed a 98 percent
profit margin [32]. Licensing also represents a strat-
egy to help establish a technology standard [55,64], or
method of avoiding expenses required to successfully
market a product on their own [32], such as the cost of
establishing a brand. Therefore, the following relation-
ship is proposed:
Proposition 3b. Though sharing core knowledge in-
volves risks, firms use contractual relationships to sup-
ply knowledge resources as a means of increasing rev-
enue.
3.4. Market competition
Competition drives firms to choose efficient sourc-
ing options, and, in conditions with low uncertainty
and multiple suppliers, market competition is likely to
offer the lowest transaction costs. The trend of shifting
work that used to be performed internally to external
suppliers is facilitated by improved cost allocation and
measurement [77]. Firms, where possible, can mini-
mize costs by taking advantage of competitive mar-
kets at different points in their value chain through out-
sourcing. Simply establishing a reputation of switching
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Table 1
Budget driven changes in F/A-22 procurement quantities [46]
Year Quantity Related event
1986 750 Initial Air Force requirement to replace F-15 aircraft
1993 442 Congressional budget cuts delay F/A-22 development and anticipated production quantities
1997 339 Congress caps F/A-22 production budget
between suppliers may contribute to a firm obtaining
lower price offers.
Under conditions of low uncertainty, using sup-
pliers as part of a firm’s pursuit of innovation can
also contribute to innovation success [49]. This comes
from outsourcing allowing each firm to focus on what
they do best. Even if contractual relationships involve
higher transaction costs, it may be effectively pursued
for strategic purposes. Finally, research recognizes that
integration of resources, even from market exchanges,
can result in competitive advantage [42]. Therefore, the
following relationship is proposed:
Proposition 4a. Under conditions of low uncertainty,
established firms will use competitive sourcing to
lower costs.
Outsourcing depends on the distribution of relevant
capabilities in an industry [40]. The process of shift-
ing work from large, established firms with large over-
heard costs to a network of generally smaller suppliers
helps to build a supporting infrastructure. A support-
ing infrastructure is also required for developing new
technology that is critical to economic development
and competitive advantage [70]. Small firms serving as
suppliers tend to spot emerging technologies faster and
are less likely to be deterred by the uncertain growth
prospects than the established firms they support [32].
The development of an industry infrastructure may be
conducive to the development of alternate technologies
that can either complement existing technology or re-
sult in the next discontinuity that may substitute for ex-
isting product technology.
While established firms have incentives to develop
complementary technology to a given technology, their
suppliers have the additional incentive to develop po-
tential technology substitutes. For example, once un-
certainty is reduced and competition increasingly fo-
cuses on price, the primary source of profit will shift
to other parts of the value chain [13]. Therefore, firms
acting as suppliers have competitive motives to both
develop new technology to gain competitive advantage
by moving into other parts of the value chain. There-
fore, the following relationship is proposed:
Proposition 4b. The suppliers to established firms are
more likely to develop alternate technologies that re-
sult in a technological discontinuity.
4. Case study
A case study following Eisenhardt’s [20] methodol-
ogy allowed outlining instances of where a firm’s or-
ganizational form changed over time. This facilitated
an examination of whether uncertainty helps explain
the selection of different firm boundaries. Specifically,
changes to Lockheed Martin’s involvement with other
firms during development and production of F/A-22
aircraft are examined. Information on Lockheed Mar-
tin organizational forms for F/A-22 aircraft develop-
ment and production was gathered from interviews
with Lockheed Martin executives and public sources.1
Although the military aircraft industry is used to out-
line the impact of uncertainty, summarized relation-
ships should persist across firms in industries where in-
novation is product oriented [55].
As the F/A-22 program has progressed, Lockheed
Martin has experienced continued pressure to lower
costs that have contributed to an increase in outsourc-
ing that is consistent with the US economy as a whole.
For example, during the 1960s aircraft firms performed
approximately 45 percent of work in house [25] com-
pared to Lockheed Martin performing 25 percent of the
work internally on the F/A-22. Pressure to lower costs
is further driven by budget constraints that limit the
number of aircraft that can be procured. Table 1 shows
how budget decisions have impacted F/A-22 procure-
ment quantities. Additionally, in 1999, a House of Rep-
resentatives vote to eliminate funding for the F/A-22
program due to rising program costs would have effec-
tively cancelled the program had it passed [51]. The
result of these actions has been continued pressure to
lower costs that placed a growing emphasis on out-
sourcing.
1The author was allowed access to Lockheed Martin executives
and subcontract management practices.
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4.1. Background
Lockheed Martin was a niche firm in the 1970s that
appeared to have lost its ability to develop fighter air-
craft with its last successful design, the F-104, dating to
the early 1950s [43]. To regain competitiveness, Lock-
heed Martin developed stealth technology using corpo-
rate funds from principles published by a Soviet radar
expert with the HAVE BLUE prototype, in 1976 [43].
The successful prototype resulted in a 1978 produc-
tion decision that resulted in the US Air Force buy-
ing 59 Lockheed Martin F-117A stealth fighters [52].
The development and production of stealth aircraft po-
sitioned the firm for the next fighter competition. Lock-
heed Martin joined the competition to develop the next
generation stealth aircraft, in 1985, after the Air Force
awarded seven firms initial concept definition contracts
to replace the F-15 Eagle [68].
The Air Force invited two contractor teams, in
1987, to build prototype aircraft as part of a com-
petitive fly-off. A partnership of Lockheed Martin,
General Dynamics and Boeing represented one team,
and Northrop and McDonnell Douglas represented the
other team [71]. In 1991, the Lockheed Martin led
team won the competitive fly-off with their YF-22 de-
sign emphasizing stealth and speed [59]. The aircraft
was subsequently renamed the F/A-22 Raptor, and the
following subsections describe the changing organiza-
tional forms Lockheed Martin used in managing the
Raptor’s development and production.
4.2. Alliance
Lockheed Martin leveraged its stealth technology to
access additional resources from partner firms Boe-
ing and General Dynamics to ensure its F/A-22 de-
sign was the most competitive. Designing and produc-
ing fighter aircraft requires capabilities above general
aerospace manufacturing with increased technological
demands for materials, avionics, engines, and systems
integration that push the limits of design and engineer-
ing knowledge. Boeing offered considerable experi-
ence with integrating avionics systems and composite
materials [43], and General Dynamics provided crucial
fly-by-wire technology, plus fighter aircraft production
experience with literally thousands of the F-16 aircraft
produced.
The alliance of Lockheed Martin with Boeing and
General Dynamics occurred before the competitive fly-
off, and allowed each firm to share the risk of design-
ing and producing a prototype.2 Delivering YF-22 pro-
totypes for the competitive fly-off involved significant
uncertainty, and each firm brought specific expertise
that resulted in improved chances of success than each
firm would have enjoyed competing separately. Shar-
ing the level of commitment needed to deliver a proto-
type lowered the overall level of uncertainty each par-
ticipating firm faced, and drew upon individual firm
strengths. Lockheed Martin’s choice of an alliance at
the beginning of F/A-22 development, when uncer-
tainty and risk was high, is consistent with Proposi-
tion 1.
4.3. Acquisition
After winning the design competition, in 1991, the
F/A-22 program began development with a focus on
testing to establish a stable, cost effective design. Win-
ning the competitive fly-off and the process of build-
ing YF-22 prototypes required learning about integrat-
ing complementary technologies, such as composites,
radar-absorbing materials and fly-by-wire flight con-
trol systems. An outcome of this learning was reduced
uncertainty that contributed to a change in the original
partnering relationship.
Lockheed Martin acquired General Dynamics’ air-
craft division for $1.52 billion, in 1993 [69]. The
transaction internalized General Dynamics’ F-16 air-
craft production and its 32.5 percent share of the F/A-
22 contract. The acquisition of General Dynamics in-
ternalized F/A-22 aircraft mid-fuselage assembly and
fly-by-wire technology. The acquisition of an alliance
partner, after experience contributed to reduced uncer-
tainty, to internalize scarce resources is consistent with
Propositions 2a and 2b.
4.4. Contractual relationships
Lockheed Martin performs competitive analysis to
identify key suppliers for F/A-22 subsystems that re-
ceive long-term contracts. The analysis considers the
cost and complexity of competition, and key subsys-
tems are subcontracted on a “sole source” basis. An
implication of Lockheed Martin selecting the most
competitive suppliers on major subsystems is that it de-
velops an infrastructure of supporting firms that pro-
vide capabilities that complement F/A-22 aircraft per-
2The terms of the alliance split the profits from collaboration with
Lockheed Martin receiving 35 percent of the profits, and Boeing and
General Dynamics each receiving 32.5 percent of the profits.
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formance. Lockheed Martin then integrates internally
and externally produced hardware and software into
fully assembled F/A-22 aircraft.
By selecting the most competitive suppliers on ma-
jor subsystems for F/A-22 aircraft development and
production, Lockheed Martin maintains a market for
technology. For example, Northrop Grumman com-
pletes roughly ten percent of F/A-22 aircraft billable
materials under subcontracts to both Lockheed Martin
and Boeing. This is true even though Northrop Grum-
man lost the original competition to the F/A-22 air-
craft design and the company continues to compete
with both Lockheed Martin and Boeing for defense
contracts. An explanation for this behavior comes from
von Hippel [66] in that knowledge sharing is common
in the aerospace industry with the exception of when
government contracts are being awarded. These prac-
tices are consistent with Proposition 3a and 3b that
firms share and access knowledge resources to lower
cost and increase revenue respectively.
4.5. Market competition
Lockheed Martin’s corporate policy on “make or
buy” decisions involves the application of competi-
tive principles in order to make “best value” deci-
sions for customers, and does not provide preferen-
tial treatment to Lockheed Martin business units. As
a result, Lockheed Martin performs less work inter-
nally on the F/A-22 program than is generally as-
sumed. For example, based on billable material, Lock-
heed Martin only performs about 25 percent of the
work on F/A-22 aircraft. Consistent with transaction
cost theory, Lockheed Martin uses competition for
general material (e.g., sheet metal, machined parts, and
electro-mechanical hardware) that involve less uncer-
tainty/complexity and where multiple suppliers exist.
More than 17 percent of billable materials for F/A-22
production are competed on an on-going basis.
Lockheed Martin also takes innovative approaches
to ensuring competition, where appropriate. For exam-
ple, Lockheed Martin has embraced electronic com-
merce to ensure competed work is awarded at the low-
est possible cost through improved information flow.
Although skepticism about applying electronic com-
merce to the aerospace industry have been voiced [46],
Lockheed Martin, in a single transaction involving an
online reverse auction, saved over $2.2 million in mate-
rial costs. Using an electronic marketplace contributes
to reduced prices through competitive forces and is
consistent with Propositions 4a.
4.6. Summary
Changing levels of uncertainty impact how firms are
organized. The experience of Lockheed Martin with
F/A-22 aircraft development and production demon-
strates that under high uncertainty firms are likely to
collaborate to lower risk. However, decreased uncer-
tainty and maturing technology build pressures for
firms to consolidate [32]. An added pressure that po-
tentially contributes to observed acquisition activity
involves learning and the need to internalize key re-
sources within a single firm. As uncertainty continues
to decline and more work is outsourced, a supporting
infrastructure for an industry develops. For example,
over 1000 suppliers in 40+ states contribute to the F/A-
22 aircraft program suppliers making with significant
contributions to F/A-22 development and production at
lower costs.
Firms acting as suppliers to industry incumbents
may be more likely to develop alternate technology
that challenges established products and firms, as a
means of appropriating an increased share of revenues.
The emergence of unmanned aircraft may represent
a potential technological discontinuity and substitute
for manned aircraft. Vigorous competition from un-
manned aircraft is expected to transform the leadership
of the aircraft industry with new entrants competing
for future unmanned aircraft development projects [8]
and, if it comes to pass, will represent an outcome con-
sistent with Proposition 4b.
5. Discussion
Integrating transaction cost economics with indus-
trial organization economics offers insight into firm
outsourcing decisions by demonstrating that firm bound-
aries evolve as uncertainty fluctuates. The combined
competitive pressures of lowering costs and maximiz-
ing revenues have contributed to firms managing un-
certainty and sharing risk by performing less work in-
ternally, resulting in lower organization costs. The pri-
mary contribution of the current research is recogniz-
ing that outsourcing involves multiple options that in-
herently consider what activities need to reside within
a firm.
Firm sourcing decisions are depicted as being driven
by varying levels of uncertainty. In industries facing in-
novative pressures, intermediate organizational forms
allow managers to select firm boundaries that balance
the risk of selecting a losing design against the risks
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of obsolescence and opportunism. Significantly, re-
search suggests that deviating from optimal organiza-
tional forms can impact a firm’s technological perfor-
mance [40]. The developed propositions are supported
in an exploratory case study, and they have implica-
tions for management research and practice.
5.1. Research implications
Management research needs to recognize that tradi-
tional firm boundaries continue to blur as firms per-
form less work internally. Although progress has been
made Lei and Hitt’s [39] observation that outsourc-
ing deserves increased scrutiny remains valid. The
propositions developed and explored here represent
an obvious starting point for continued research on
firm boundaries. Viewing the current propositions as
a whole shows that firm sourcing decisions change as
technology and industry conditions co-evolve, helping
to explain potentially contradictory observations in ex-
isting research. An implication is that there is a need
for longitudinal research to help account for changes in
firm sourcing decisions. By relating firm sourcing de-
cisions to a response to changing uncertainty, the cur-
rent paper may also inform management research ex-
amining management behavior and firm evolution.
Finally, the creation of a supporting infrastructure
through outsourcing may begin to explain the source of
technology discontinuities. Existing research has pri-
marily examined the diffusion of technology and its
impacts, while forces that explain the origins of inno-
vations remain largely unexamined. There is a clear
need to better understand the source of innovations, if
only because of the sweeping changes that follow in
their wake. The current research suggests that the firms
and the industries they operate in that are most effected
by technology innovations may ultimately contribute
to what Schumpeter [60] called creative destruction.
5.2. Implications for practice
The preceding observations also suggest implica-
tions for managers. The need to adapt innovation mode
selection requires that a firm’s managers recognize
that there are several viable methods for dealing with
uncertainty and that they should avoid specializing
only in alliances, acquisitions or market transactions.
To remain competitive, a firm will need to be profi-
cient in multiple sourcing methods to adapt as an in-
dustry’s technology changes and matures. Used effec-
tively, outsourcing can facilitate manager efforts to fo-
cus a firm on developing and maintaining competitive
core competencies. For example, there is the potential
to leverage and potentially learn from external relation-
ships created by extending firm boundaries. Further,
managers may consider entering multiple relationships
with external partners as a means to decrease oppor-
tunism – firms are less likely to renege when the pos-
sibility of sanctions on another relationship exists [3].
Managers may also need to demonstrate a willingness
to switch suppliers as a method of signaling to external
partners that they need to offer competitive pricing. Fi-
nally, the current treatment of innovation suggests that
it is less random than is generally assumed and pro-
vides managers actionable knowledge.
5.3. Limitations
The application of the current propositions in future
research will need to consider at least two qualifica-
tions. First, as indicated prior to Proposition 2a, the re-
lationships described are not inevitable. The range of
sourcing options is limited only by the imagination of
the managers. A contribution of the current paper is not
simply treating outsourcing as a homogeneous prac-
tice. Second, the arguments rely on the assumptions
that firms face uncertainty along with cost pressures to
lower costs and increase revenues that force managers
to continually adapt or adjust firm boundaries. The de-
gree that this assumption holds across different indus-
tries will limit the application of the current proposi-
tions; however, it is likely that the industries where this
assumption holds will drive economic growth [58].
5.4. Conclusion
Even with recognized limitations, the present re-
search offers clear contributions to current knowledge.
Managers consider uncertainty in adapting firm bound-
aries to keep their firm competitive. Developed propo-
sitions integrate different theoretical perspectives to
provide a more complete view of firm sourcing de-
cisions. Specifically, the delineation of the impact of
uncertainty on firm outsourcing decisions represents a
potentially important contribution to the continued de-
velopment of both management research and practice.
In closing, the relationships developed and explored
here with a case study represent promising areas for
additional research.
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